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Abstract
We study a problem of allocating divisible jobs, arriving online, to
workers in a crowdsourcing setting which involves learning two param-
eters of strategically behaving workers. Each job is split into a certain
number of tasks that are then allocated to workers. Each arriving
job has to be completed within a deadline and each task has to be
completed satisfying an upper bound on probability of failure. The
job population is homogeneous while the workers are heterogeneous
in terms of costs, completion times, and times to failure. The job
completion time and time to failure of each worker are stochastic with
fixed but unknown means. The requester is faced with the challenge
of learning two separate parameters of each (strategically behaving)
worker simultaneously, namely, the mean job completion time and the
mean time to failure. The time to failure of a worker depends on the
duration of the task handled by the worker. Assuming non-strategic
workers to start with, we solve this biparameter learning problem by
applying the Robust UCB algorithm. Then, we non-trivially extend
this algorithm to the setting where the workers are strategic about their
costs. Our proposed mechanism is dominant strategy incentive com-
patible and ex-post individually rational with asymptotically optimal
regret performance.
1 Introduction
Crowdsourcing is widely used in procuring labels and services for traditional
AI applications. Often many of the tasks crowdsourced are more readily
accomplished by humans than computers. An additional advantage is the
scalable and cost-effective nature of crowdsourcing. However, typical crowd-
sourcing platforms may not consider several important aspects of traditional
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planning such as ensuring work completion within a strict deadline and with
assured guarantees on the quality.
As a motivating example for this paper, consider a sequence of jobs
arriving online where each job corresponds to translating a large document
which has to be completed within a deadline and with an assured level of
accuracy. It may not be possible for a single individual worker to accomplish
this job, so the requester could split such a job into tasks (either at chapter
or section or any other level) and allocate each task to a crowd worker. Due
to the very nature of the task, a worker, if employed for a long duration,
might start committing errors. We refer to the duration until which an agent
works without committing any error as the time to failure (TTF). Also, each
worker differs in the time taken to complete the entire job (if the entire job
is executed by the worker). The time taken by a worker to complete the job
all by himself is called the job completion time (JCT) of that worker. Each
worker incurs a certain cost to complete the entire job. Note that the workers
are heterogeneous in terms of their costs, JCT, and TTF. Moreover, JCT
and TTF of the workers are stochastic. An additional non-trivial challenge
occurs when crowd workers are strategic and may misrepresent their costs
in the hope of gaining higher utility. This setting occurs in other problems
such as tagging of a large repository of images, audio transcriptions, etc.
In this work, we consider jobs which (a) arrive online, (b) are divisible
(into tasks), (c) have strict completion deadlines, and (d) are to be completed
with an assured accuracy. We propose a multi-armed bandit (MAB) mech-
anism which learns the two parameters (mean job completion time (MJCT)
and mean time to failure (MTTF)) of the workers while eliciting their pri-
vately held costs truthfully. We show that the proposed MAB mechanism
minimizes the regret while meeting the deadline and accuracy requirements
on every job. The following are the specific contributions of this work.
1. Non-strategic, with learning: We look at the problem of allocating
divisible online jobs to crowd workers so as to meet the constraints on
deadline and accuracy (Section 4). The underlying optimization prob-
lem turns out to be non-trivial since the parameters MJCT and MTTF
of the workers are unknown. We overcome this challenge by devising a
biparameter learning scheme based on the Robust UCB algorithm [5].
Further, we embed this learning scheme into our social welfare maximiz-
ing algorithm, which we refer to as SW-GREEDY.
2. Strategic, with learning: We next non-trivially extend the results
above to the setting where worker costs are privately held (Section 5) by
designing a mechanism (TD-UCB). This mechanism is is dominant strat-
egy incentive compatible and ex-post individually rational (Theorem 1).
3. Regret Analysis: In Section 6, we show, for non-strategic as well as
strategic settings, that the number of jobs for which a non-optimal worker
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set is chosen, is upper bounded by O(log T ) (Theorem 2), where T is the
total number of jobs to be completed. Moreover, once an optimal worker
set is selected, the allocation algorithm converges asymptotically to an
efficient allocation, ensuring that the average regret goes to zero in the
limit (Theorem 3).
4. Simulations: Finally, we show the practical efficacy of our learning
mechanism via simulations in Section 7.
2 Previous Work
We now look at previous work related to our setting. We group the relevant
literature based on whether or not crowd workers are strategic.
In the non-strategic case, most of the work in crowdsourcing has focused
on models for aggregating labels and building classifiers [13, 12]. Many
efforts also address problems similar to the one considered in our paper.
Faradani et al. [9] look at the design of pricing schemes dependent on the
completion times of the workers. The strategic nature of the workers is not
considered here. The problem of completing tasks within a deadline is also
investigated by Yu et al. [16]. The authors consider the setting where the
workers delegate tasks to other workers when they are unable to complete
the work within a deadline. Here the costs to workers are assumed to be
known and workers are non-strategic. Under a different setup, Ding et al. [8]
look at the budgeted multi-armed bandit problem where the two parameters
stochastic costs and stochastic rewards are learnt. However, they do not
consider strategic workers.
In the strategic case, Chandra et al. [6] look at allocating indivisible tasks
to strategic crowd workers under deadline constraints with the assumption
that the reliability (in terms of completion of the task) of the agents is
common knowledge and not estimated. Singer and Mittal [14] and Biswas
et al. [3] look at pricing mechanisms in the presence of budget constraints
and task completion deadlines. However, the heterogeneity with respect to
time to failure is not modelled. Tran-Thanh et al. [15] look at crowdsourcing
classification tasks with the goal of trading off cost and accuracy of the
estimation. However the TTF and JCT of the workers is not modeled here.
Choosing an optimal worker set in order to obtain an assured accuracy level
has been studied in Jain et al. [11]. The allocation algorithm makes use
of the multi-armed bandits abstraction Auer et al. [1]. A version of their
allocation algorithm was designed for the case where workers are strategic
with respect to bidding their costs. However, their setting does not look at
the completion of tasks within a deadline. The problem of allocating tasks
concurrently to several workers in order to meet deadlines is looked at by
Gerding et al. [10]. The work uses a variant of VCG mechanism to elicit
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the costs truthfully from the workers. They consider stochastic completion
times of tasks but do not consider the time to failure during the allocation.
Our work differs from all the work listed above in that, we design an
allocation scheme to complete jobs within a deadline while simultaneously
learning the mean completion time as well as the mean time to failure of
the workers. We also design a mechanism to elicit the costs of the workers
truthfully.
3 The Model
Let N = {1, . . . , n} denote the set of crowd workers (also referred to as
agents) available to the requester. A sequence of T homogeneous jobs arrives
at the platform, one at a time. Following are some of the design issues
pertaining to the requester.
1. Job Parameters
(a) Deadline: The clock starts ticking for a job as soon as it arrives. We use
D to denote the deadline. The deadline D on each job is an upper bound
on the duration, starting from the arrival of that job, before which the
job is required to be completed in expectation.
(b) Task creation: The requester can divide a current job t (t = 1, . . . , T )
into a certain number of tasks so as to facilitate completion of the job by
the deadline D. We use x
(t)
i to denote the fraction of the job t assigned
as a task to the worker i. Therefore, 0 ≤ x(t)i ≤ 1 and
∑n
i=1 x
(t)
i = 1.
We assume arbitrary division of a given job into tasks for ease of expo-
sition. However, this assumption can be relaxed to capture meaningful
constraints such as the size of the task.
(c) Threshold on probability of failure for tasks: A worker is more likely to
commit an error if he works for a longer duration on a task. We say a
worker has failed when he commits an error. We use ε to denote (the
common) threshold on probability of failure for any task. This threshold
allows the requester to control the overall “quality” of the job.
2. Worker Parameters
(a) Job Completion Time (JCT): A worker has a stochastic job completion
time, which is the time he requires to complete the entire job by himself.
JCT for a worker is random variable with a fixed but unknown mean. We
refer to the mean job completion time as MJCT. The requester wishes
to learn the MJCT for each worker. If ρi is the MJCT of worker i, then
the task allocation x
(t)
i will meet the deadline constraint in expectation if
x
(t)
i × ρi ≤ D.
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(b) Time to Failure (TTF): A worker is also characterized by a stochastic
time to failure, which denotes the duration for which a worker would
work without a failure. Like JCT, TTF also has a fixed yet unknown
mean, which the requester wishes to learn. If Fi is the CDF of TTF
for agent i, who workers for a expected duration x
(t)
i × ρi on the task
allocation given by the fraction x
(t)
i of job t, the requirement on threshold
probability error dictates Fi(x
(t)
i × ρi) ≤ ε.
(c) Cost Incurred: Worker i has a privately held cost ci ∈ [c, c¯] which rep-
resents the cost incurred by worker i to complete the job entirely on his
own. Therefore, the cost involved to complete x
(t)
i fraction of the job by
the worker i is cix
(t)
i .
3. Goal of Optimization Problem: The constraints on deadline and
threshold on probability of failure for every task has to be met in a cost
optimal way for every online job t. Thus, the underlying optimization
problem for the entire collection of jobs {1, 2, . . . , T} is given by eq. (1).
min
x
(t)
i ∈[0,1]
T∑
t=1
n∑
i=1
cix
(t)
i ,
subject to,∑n
i=1 x
(t)
i = 1,∀t
Completion time(x
(t)
i ) ≤ D ∀i ∈ N, ∀t,
Probability of failure(x
(t)
i ) ≤ ε ∀i ∈ N, ∀t.
(1)
As mentioned earlier, the JCT and the TTF of the workers are stochastic in
nature. We assume the JCT of each worker follows a log-normal distribution
with unknown yet fixed mean ρi ∈ [ρ, ρ¯] while the TTF for each worker
follows an exponential distribution with mean βi ∈ [β, β¯].
Remark 1 (Choice of Distributions). The choice of log-normal distribution
is due to its wide applicability in social sciences and economics to model sim-
ilar quantities. However any suitable non-negative random variable whose
distribution is sub-Gaussian (or sub-exponential) may be used. As discussed,
the errors in this setting are introduced due to higher working duration on
the task. This is analogous to the modelling of failure as function of time, in
biological or computer or reliability literature, as exponential distributions.
Hence, we model the TTF of the workers as exponential.
The optimization problem stated in eq. (1) involves a learning scheme
along with cost minimization across all the T online jobs. However, due to
independence across the jobs, the problem can be decomposed into a sequen-
tial cost minimization problem corresponding to each job (t). Therefore, in
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eq. (1) the summation over the jobs can be omitted. This enables us to use
xi in place of x
(t)
i for the sequential optimization problem for each job.
4 The Case of Non-Strategic Workers
We first study the scenario where the costs ci incurred by the workers are
common knowledge. If the means (ρi and βi) are known to the requester,
no feasible allocation xi to the worker i should exceed D/ρi. The additional
requirement on accuracy requires that the probability of a worker failing in
the duration ρixi does not exceed ε. This is equivalent to the constraint
Fi(ρixi) ≤ ε where Fi is the CDF of the random variable TTF of worker i
which we model as the exponential distribution with mean βi. On simplifi-
cation, the requester’s optimization problem reduces to eq. (2).
min
xi∈[0,1]
n∑
i=1
cixi,
subject to,∑n
i=1 xi = 1,
xi ≤ 1ρi min
(
D,βi ln
(
1
1−ε
))
∀i ∈ N,
(2)
In practice, ρi and βi are not known and need to be learnt. We make use of
the multi-armed bandit (MAB) abstraction for learning these parameters.
More specifically, since ρi and βi are sub-exponential distributions, we appeal
to the Robust UCB technique [5]. While ψ-UCB algorithm [4] is a regret
minimizing scheme for learning the mean of sub-Gaussian distributions, for
heavy tailed distributions (e.g. log normal and exponential), Robust UCB
has been shown to be regret minimizing [5]. We adopt the Robust UCB
scheme with truncated empirical mean as the estimator.
4.1 Difficulty in Learning βi
If a worker i, allocated a fraction xi of the job, takes time τ for completion,
then τ/xi is a sample from the distribution log-normal(ρi). Therefore, ev-
ery allocation contributes one such sample for the Robust UCB algorithm
estimating ρi. However, for estimating βi, each sample allocation fed to the
Robust UCB algorithm must correspond to a failure, but this is not practi-
cal as we do not observe failure at every instance of allocation. To handle
this difficulty, we propose to use a surrogate random variable. Consider the
experiment where a worker i is allocated a task (fraction of a job) on which
the worker spends a duration of at least δ. The experiment is deemed to
have failed if the worker i fails in the first δ duration of allocation, otherwise
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it is deemed a success. Let N
(i)
δ be the number of such independent experi-
ments till a failure is encountered. We propose to use the random variable
β
′
δ,i = δ ×N (i)δ to construct a sample from exponential(βi). To obtain such
a sample, for every job t, we observe for a duration δ to see if any of the
allocated workers have failed. Let η
(i)
δ be the number of contiguous instances
(of jobs) of allocation during which a worker i does not fail in the interval
δ. Note that η
(i)
δ is a sample from N
(i)
δ . Therefore, the value δ×η(i)δ forms a
sample of interest. Once a sample is obtained, η
(i)
δ is reset and the process
is again repeated to collect more samples. The expectation of the surrogate
random variable in the limit coincides with βi due to Lemma 1.
Lemma 1. limδ→0 E[β
′
δ,i] = βi
Proof. By definition, β
′
δ,i = N
(i)
δ ×δ. Note, Nδ ∼ Geometric(1−exp(−δ/βi))
and therefore, E[Nδ] = 11−exp(−δ/βi) .
lim
δ→0
E[β
′
δ,i] = lim
δ→0
δ
1− exp(−δ/βi) = βi (3)
where eq. (3) follows by applying the L’Hospital’s rule.
4.2 SW-GREEDY: A Greedy Allocation
The workers are indexed in an increasing order of their costs and each worker
i is allocated the largest possible fraction xPSTi which does not violate the
constraints in eq. (2) till all tasks of the job are allocated.
The constraint 1ρi min
(
D,βi ln
(
1
1−ε
))
, involves means which are un-
known. As mentioned earlier, we use Robust UCB to learn estimates for ρi
and βi. ρˆ
+
i and βˆ
+
i are the upper confidence indices while ρˆ
−
i and βˆ
−
i are the
lower confidence indices of MJCT and MTTF respectively, obtained from
Robust UCB. ρˆi and βˆi are the empirical estimates of MJCT and MTTF
respectively for worker i. We could substitute ρˆ−i , ρˆi or ρˆ
+
i as the estimate
for ρi in our constraint. A higher value of ρi enforces a lower allocation
to worker i compared to when a lower value of ρi is used. Hence we refer
to ρˆ+i as a pessimistic estimate for ρi. By a similar reasoning, we refer to
βˆ−i as the pessimistic estimate for βi. The use of the pessimistic estimates
ensures that even with the true underlying means the constraint in eq. (2)
is satisfied.
The allocation algorithm discussed above ensures that the social welfare
regret of the learning scheme is optimized, hence we refer to the above
allocation as SW-GREEDY (Algorithm 1). The social welfare is defined as
follows.
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Definition 1. Social Welfare: Social welfare of a feasible (i.e. satisfying
eq. (2)) allocation x is the sum of valuations of the agents under that allo-
cation. In this setting, the valuation of a crowd agent is −cixi. Therefore,
social welfare is given by
∑n
i=1−cixi.
Every worker i is paid an amount equal to the cost incurred, i.e. xPSTi (t)×
ci, where x
PST
i is the allocation to agent i given by Algorithm 1.
Remark 2 (Pessimistic Selection). The fundamental underlying philosophy
of the UCB family of algorithms is “optimism under uncertainty.” Intu-
itively, this optimism helps in adequate exploration realtive to a naive scheme
which just uses the empirical estimate. In our work, we do not use this
philosophy implicitly, however, due to the greedy nature of the allocation
scheme, the pessimistic allocation set is a superset of the optimistic alloca-
tion.
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ALGORITHM 1: SW-GREEDY Allocation Algorithm
Input: Set of workers N , number of jobs T , deadline D, accuracy
level ε, input cost vector: c1 ≤ c2 ≤ . . . ≤ cn (By re-indexing
N)
1 ∀i ∈ N , ρˆi = ρ¯, ρˆ+i = ρ¯, ρˆ−i = ρ, Ni,t=0
2 βˆi = β, βˆ
+
i = β¯, βˆ
−
i = β, N
β
i,t = 0,
3 η
(i)
δ = 0
4 for Online job arrival t = 1, . . . , T do
5 xPST(t) = {xPST1 (t), . . . , xPSTn (t)} = {0, . . . , 0}
6 i = 1
7 while
∑n
j=1 x
PST
j (t) < 1 do
8 xPSTi (t) =
1
ρˆ+i
min
(
D,β−i ln
[
1
1−ε
])
9 if 1−∑i−1j=1 xPSTj (t) < xPSTi (t) then
10 xPSTi (t) = 1−
∑i−1
j=1 x
PST
j (t)
11 i = i+ 1
12 Define k¯t = max{i : xPSTi > 0}
13 Allocate the job t as per xPSTi
14 Observe τ˜i, the time of completion of x
PST
i by i
15 ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k¯t}, Ni,t = Ni,t−1 + 1
16 ρˆi =
(
Ni,t−1 × ρˆi + τ˜ixPSTi (t)
)
× 1Ni,t
17 for i ∈ {1, . . . , k¯t} do
18 if Worker i made an error during δ then
19 βˆi =
βˆi×Nβi,t−1+(δ×η(i)δ )
Nβi,t−1+1
20 Nβi,t = N
β
i,t−1 + 1
21 η
(i)
δ = 0
22 else
23 η
(i)
δ = η
(i)
δ + 1
24 Nβi,t = N
β
i,t−1
Initialize
Pessimistic
Selection
Updates
for
Surrogate
of βi
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5 The Case of Strategic Workers: TD-UCB
Here, before an allocation is performed, the agents announce their bids.
These bids may or may not be equal to their true private costs. We denote
the bid profile by (bi, b−i), where bi is the bid of agent i and b−i denotes the
collection of bids of all agents except agent i. In order to ensure that the
agents bid their costs truthfully, we introduce a mechanism TD-UCB. The
allocation rule remains the same as the one for the case where the workers
are non-strategic. We use the allocation given in Algorithm 1 replacing the
input costs with the bids.
5.1 Payment Scheme
Let ξt denote a tuple of allocation and performance of the allocated workers
for the job t. The learning until job t is captured in the history ht = {ξk}tk=0.
In order to specify the payment scheme, we require the notion of ‘externality’
imposed by an agent on another. We denote the externality imposed by
agent i on j as xEXTi,j (bi, b−i;ht, t), which signifies the additional fraction of
the job allocated to the agent j in the absence of agent i. The externality
for the job t depends on the bid profile (bi, b−i) as well as the history of
allocations till job t. Let kt be the agent with the largest reported bid in the
worker set chosen by the allocation scheme. Figure 1 provides a schematic
diagram indicating the position of the bids and the agents chosen by our
algorithm.
Agent 1
b1 ≤
Agent 2
b2 ≤ . . .
Agent kt
bkt≤ ≤
Agent n
bn≤. . .
Workers chosen by the allocation
Bids by the workers
Figure 1: Schematic of the allocation
Formally, the externality is defined as
xEXTi,j (bi, b−i; t) =

0 if j < kt or i > kt,
Z1 if j = kt,
Z2 if j > kt, where,
(4)
Z1 = min
(
1
ρˆ+j
min
(
D, βˆ−j log
(
1
1− 
))
− xPSTj (t), xPSTi (t)
)
,
Z2 = min
 1
ρˆ+j
min
(
D, βˆ−j log
(
1
1− 
))
, xPSTi (t)−
j−1∑
s=kt
xEXTi,s (t)

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We now propose a payment structure in eq. (5) that ensures truthful
bidding and positive utility to the participating agents (Theorem 1).
pi(bi, b−i; t) =
{
0 if i > kt,
Z3 otherwise, where,
(5)
Z3 =
n∑
s=kt
[
xEXTi,s (t)× bs
]
+
xPSTi (t)− n∑
s=kt
xEXTi,s (t)
× c¯
Remark 3 (Notation). All the mechanism side parameters such as xPSTi or
pi are a function of (bi, b−i;ht, t). Similarly, the agent side parameters such
as utility ui depend on the tuple (bi, b−i; ci, ht, t). Note that the agent side
parameters have an additional dependency on the true cost ci. Whenever
clear from the context, we drop one or more of these dependencies for ease
of notation.
Remark 4 (Externality). Our mechanism is an externality based scheme
like the VCG mechanism. We now set about the task of proving that the
mechanism is truthul, regret minimizing, and individually rational, while
learning the associated stochastic parameters. Earlier works have shown the
non-triviality involved in the design of such learning mechanisms [2, 7].
5.2 Properties of TD-UCB Mechanism
Definition 2. Utility of an Agent: The utility of an agent in this setting is
the difference between the valuation of an allocation and the payment made.
The utility is given by the following.
ui(bi, b−i; ci, ht, t) = −ci × xPSTi (bi, b−i; ci, ht, t) + pi(bi, b−i; ci, ht, t)
Definition 3. Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatible (DSIC): A mecha-
nism is DSIC if the utility ui(ci, b−i; ci) ≥ ui(bi, b−i; ci) ∀bi ∈ [c, c], ∀b−i ∈
[c, c]n−1, ∀i ∈ N , where bi and ci are the bid and true cost incurred by the
worker i respectively, b−i is the bid profile of all agents other than i.
A DSIC mechanism ensures that an agent obtains the highest utility by
bidding his true cost, irrespective of the bids of other agents.
Definition 4. Ex-post Individually Rational (IR): A mechanism is ex-post
individually rational if ui(ci, b−i; ci) ≥ 0), ∀b−i ∈ [c, c]n−1 ∀i ∈ N .
An IR mechanism ensures that for every agent, the utility obtained from
truthful bidding of the costs is non-negative.
Theorem 1. The TD-UCB mechanism is DSIC and IR.
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Proof. IR is immediate and follows from the definition of the payment
scheme of the mechanism (eq. (5)).
We prove the DSIC property by examining different possible scenarios of
allocation for an agent. In each of these scenarios, we compute the utilities
with truthful bids as against strategic misreports of bids.
For performing any job t, utility of a worker i is defined as follows.
ui(bi, b−i; ci) = pi(bi, b−i)− ci × xPSTi (bi, b−i) (6)
where xPSTi (bi, b−i) and pi(bi, b−i) are the allocation and the payment to the
worker i respectively. We consider the following three possible scenarios for
the positioning of each worker i in the increasing order of ranking of the bids
of the workers. We refer to the set of workers with non-zero task allocation
as the active set in this proof. Throughout the proof, we denote by A the
active set of allocated workers when agent i bids his true cost ci. We denote
by A′ the active set when the agent bids untruthfully.
• Case 1: i > kt
In this scenario, when the agent bids truthfully,
b1 < b2 < · · · < bkt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Bids fromA
< · · · < bi−1 < ci < bi+1 < · · · < cN
When the worker reports his cost truthfully (i.e, bi = ci), he does not re-
ceive any allocation and therefore ui(ci, b−i; ci) = 0. Now we consider the
following two cases when he misreports his cost.
a) Overbid of cost (bi > ci) :
Since xPSTi (ci, b−i; ci) = 0, a higher bid bi would only place the agent at
a position oi(bi, b−i) ≥ oi(ci, b−i) = i in the revised ranking order. At
the position oi(bi, b−i), again the allocation to him would be zero, that
is, xPSTi (bi, b−i; ci) = 0 and thereby the utility from overbidding would be
same as the utility from truthful bidding. Hence, he does not benefit from
overbidding his cost.
b) Underbid of cost (bi < ci):
Here there could be two possibilities:
(i) bi ≥ bkt : This scenario is identical to case 1(a) shown above and hence
there is no incentive for the agent to bid in this manner.
(ii) bi < bkt : With such a bid, the agent i is able to enter the active set of
allocated workers.
Let the position of the agent i in the new active set A′ be j, that is,
oi(bi, b−i) = j, and the agent with the highest bid in A′ is kt
′ ≤ kt.
Therefore, by underbidding his cost, agent i is able to move the workers
12
p ∈ {kt′ + 1, · · · , kt} out of the active set. We now show that such a bid
does not fetch agent i an increased utility. As per the payment structure,
pi(bi, b−i) =
kt∑
s=kt
′
xEXTi,s (bi, b−i)bs
+
N∑
s=kt+1
xEXTi,s (bi, b−i)bs
+
xPSTi (bi, b−i)− N∑
s=kt
′
,s 6=i
xEXTi,s (bi, b−i)
 c (7)
The second term in eq. (7) is zero, this is due to the fact that in absence
of agent i {1, 2, . . . , kt} can complete the current job t. Therefore, with
even an underbid i has no externality on agents {kt + 1, . . . , n}. The third
term in eq. (7) is also zero as the allocation with truthful bidding was
enough to complete the job t by agents {1, 2, . . . , kt}. Hence in absence of
i the allocation with underbid xPSTi (bi, b−i) is met by the externality sum.
By underbidding, the agent i is therefore able to obtain the portions of
the job which would have been allocated to s ∈ {kt′ + 1, · · · , kt}. For all
such agents s, xEXTi,s (bi, b−i) > 0, since in the absence of i, these agents
would have received an allocation. But note that bs < ci and so these
agents contribute towards a negative utility. Therefore the net utility
ui(bi, b−i; ci) < ui(ci, b−i; ci).
• Case 2: i = kt.
When agent i bids truthfully, the active set is as follows:
b1 ≤ · · · ≤ bj ≤ · · · ≤ ci︸ ︷︷ ︸
Bids fromA
≤ bi+1 · · ·
and the payment to agent i
pi(ci,b−i) =
N∑
s=i+1
xEXTi,s (ci, b−i)bs
+
(
xPSTi (ci, b−i)−
n∑
s=i+1
xEXTi,s (ci, b−i)
)
c (8)
a) Overbid of cost (bi > ci):
Here we look at two possible values of the range of the bids.
(i) An overbid such that agent i no longer belongs to the active set A′: At
the position oi(bi, b−i), the allocation to him is zero, that is, xPSTi (bi, b−i; ci) =
0 and thereby the utility from overbidding would be less than the utility
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from truthful bidding. Hence, he does not benefit from overbidding his
cost in this manner.
(ii) An overbid such that agent i remains in the active set but brings in
other higher cost agents into the active set : Suppose the active set A′
contains the agents {i + 1, · · · , p} in addition to the set A, such that,
without loss of generality,
b1 < · · · < bi−1 < bi+1 < · · · < bp < bi︸ ︷︷ ︸
Bids fromA′
< bp+1 < · · ·
The payment to agent i with overbid is,
pi(bi,b−i) =
N∑
s=p+1
xEXTi,s (bi, b−i)bs
+ (xPSTi (bi, b−i)−
n∑
s=p+1
xEXTi,s (bi, b−i))c (9)
Since the agents {i+ 1, · · · , p} have moved before i in the ordering of the
bids, those agents do not contribute to pi(bi, b−i) further. However, for
the agents s ∈ {p + 1, · · · , N}, xEXTi,s (bi, b−i) = xEXTi,s (ci, b−i) because the
same proportion of job must be reassigned to the agent s when i bids bi
as well as when i is truthful. The first term in eq. (8) therefore strictly
exceeds first term in eq. (9). We now show that the second terms in eq. (8)
and eq. (9) are equal. Observe that,
xPSTi (ci, b−i) = x
PST
i (bi, b−i) +
p∑
s=i+1
xPSTj (bi, b−i)
= xPSTi (bi, b−i) +
p∑
s=i+1
xEXTi,s (bi, b−i)
A simple substitution for xPSTi (bi, b−i) in eq. (9) shows that the second
terms in eq. (8) and eq. (9) are equal. Therefore the overall payment
pi(bi, b−i) < pi(ci, b−i) and further ui(bi, b−i; ci) < ui(ci, b−i; ci).
b) Underbid of cost ( bi < ci): Note that in this scenario, there are the
following two possibilities.
(i) The active set A′ = A. The agent i moves to a new position j, that is,
oi(bi, b−i) = j. Without loss of generality, we can consider that the agent
with the highest bid in A′ is now agent i − 1. The ordering of the agents
is now,
b1 ≤ · · · ≤ bj−1 ≤ bi ≤ bj ≤ bi−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Bids fromA′
≤ bi+1 · · · .
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By our payment structure,
pi(bi,b−i) =
N∑
s=i−1
s 6=i
xEXTi,s (bi, b−i)bs
+ (xPSTi (bi, b−i)−
N∑
s=i−1
s 6=i
xEXTi,s (bi, b−i))c (10)
Since the active set remains the same in spite of underbidding, ∀s, i+ 1 ≤
s ≤ N , xEXTi,s (bi, b−i) = xEXTi,s (ci, b−i) and in addition, xEXTi,i−1(bi, b−i) > 0, but,
bi−1 < ci. Therefore, the first term in eq. (8) exceeds the first term in
eq. (10). We also know that,
xPSTi (bi, b−i) = x
PST
i (ci, b−i) + x
EXT
i,i−1(bi, b−i) (11)
since the additional allocation that i gets due to an overbid would be
allocated to the last agent i − 1 in A′, in the absence of i. A simple
substitution in eq. (10) shows that the second terms in eq. (8) and eq. (10)
are equal. Therefore ui(bi, b−i; ci) < ui(ci, c−i; ci).
(ii) The active set A′ due to underbidding by agent i is smaller than the active
set A due to truthful bidding by agent i: This means that some agents get
removed from A. Suppose the agents s ∈ {j + 1, · · · , i − 1} get pushed
out in the active set A′. Then by a similar argument as in the case 2 (b)
(i) above, xEXTi,s (bi, b−i) > 0, but bs < ci. Therefore these agents contribute
towards a negative utility and hence, ui(bi, b−i; ci) < ui(ci, c−i; ci).
• Case 3: i < kt
a) Overbid of cost (bi > ci):
If the agent i bids a higher cost, the position of i in the ranking order
changes to one of the following.
(i) i ≤ oi(bi, b−i) < kt: The allocation to the worker remains the same
as when he is truthful, that is, xPSTi (bi, b−i) = x
PST
i (ci, b−i). Our pay-
ment structure ensures that the payment pi(bi, b−i) = pi(ci, b−i) and hence
ui(bi, b−i; ci) = ui(ci, b−i; ci).
(ii) oi(bi, b−i) = kt: In this case, agent i ends up losing a part of xPSTi (ci, b−i)
to the worker kt. This scenario is analogous to Case 2 (a) (ii) where a
worker who bids truthfully would have been at the last position kt, but by
overbidding ends up sharing his allocation with other agents. Therefore
ui(bi, b−i; ci) < ui(ci, b−i; ci).
(iii) oi(bi, b−i) > kt: Here, agent i does not receive any allocation and thereby
his payment as well as utility are both zero.
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b) Underbid of cost (bi < ci):
Upon bidding a lower cost, the agent moves further up in the ranking or-
der, that is oi(bi, b−i) ≤ i. The allocation also does not change, that is,
xPSTi (bi, b−i) = x
PST
i (ci, b−i). Our payment structure ensures that the pay-
ment pi(bi, b−i) = pi(ci, b−i) and hence ui(bi, b−i; ci) = ui(ci, b−i; ci).
Future rounds: If the agent i ignores the loss incurred in the current job t
and chooses to manipulate the current bid for future utility, the resulting
argument rolls back to one the above three cases.
6 Regret Analysis
In the strategic as well as the non-strategic settings, the underlying op-
timization problem involves parameters that are learnt in tandem. Hence
regret is an important notion which we analyse in this section. Following are
some relevant definitions. A problem instance in this space is characterized
by a set of crowd agents N , the vector c of their costs, the mean vectors
(ρ, β), and the design parameters – Deadline(D), accuracy (ε).
Definition 5. Optimal worker set: For a problem instance with all the
parameters known, in the solution to the optimization problem of eq. (2),
we refer to the set of agents allocated non-zero fraction of the job as the the
optimal worker set.
Definition 6. Optimal allocation: We refer to the solution of eq. (2) as the
optimal allocation.
Definition 7. ∆-Separation: Let k∗ be the agent in the optimal worker set
with the highest bid. In the optimal allocation (social welfare maximizing),
all workers’ allocation except k∗ would meet the constraints in eq. (2) with
equality. We refer to the ∆-separation as the additional fraction of the job
which agent k∗ can take without violating any of the constraints. As all the
stochastic parameters in this space are continuous, almost surely ∆ > 0.
Definition 8. Regret: A learning mechanism in this space suffers a loss in
social welfare due to either a) non-optimal set selection or b) due to subop-
timal allocation within the optimal set. Formally, regret of a mechanism A,
is given by
R(A) = T
n∑
i=1
cix
∗
i −
T∑
t=1
n∑
i=1
cix
(A)
i (t),
where x
(A)
i (t) is the allocation to the agent i for the job t by the mechanism
A.
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We use the truncated empirical estimator within our Robust UCB scheme.
Through an invocation of the Bernstein inequality, we have, with high con-
fidence (probability > 1− t−4 for the tth job), the true mean lies within the
Robust UCB and LCB indices(see Lemma 1 in [5]). With enough samples,
the symmetric indices of the Robust UCB scheme shrinks small enough so
that no additional agents than the optimal set are required to meet the
spill-over even due to the pessimistic strategy used.
Theorem 2. The TD-UCB mechanism selects an optimal set after the job
t′ ∈ O(log T ).
Proof. We denote k∗ as the costliest agent in the optimal set. Let x∗ =
{x∗1, . . . , x∗k∗} denote the allocations when the means are known. Consider
∆,
∆ =
min(D,βk∗ log(
1
1−ε))
ρk∗
− xk∗(t, β)
∆ denotes the additional fraction of work the agent k∗ can take up without
violating the constraints. Following is a sufficient condition on t when the
set selected by the pessimistic estimate matches the optimal set.
Need to get :x∗i (ρ, β)− xPSTi (t) ≤ ∆n , ∀i ≤ k∗ (12)
We denote ρRI(t) and βRI(t) as the Robust UCB indices of the JCT and the
TTF of a worker in the active set. Recall, the active set for job t denotes
an agent allocated a non-zero fraction of the job. The expression for the
pessimistic allocation ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k∗} at job t is given by
xPSTi (t)× (ρˆi + ρRI) = min
(
D, (βˆi − βRI) log
(
1
1− ε
))
(13)
The allocation xPSTi is determined by equality in eq. (13) whenever the set
chosen is not optimal. We analyse this allocation via two cases to determine
the job t when condition in eq. (12) is met.
Case (i): xPSTi (t)× (ρˆi + ρRI) = D or xPSTi (t) = Dρˆi+ρRI Consider,
x∗i (ρ, β)− xPSTi (t)
=
min
(
D,βi log
(
1
1−ε
))
ρi
− D
ρˆi + ρRI
≤ D
ρi
− D
ρˆi + ρRI
≤ D
ρˆi − ρRI −
D
ρˆi + ρRI
[∵ w.h.p. ρi ≥ ρˆi − ρRI]
≤ 2DρRI
ρ2
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In the current case, we have that the sufficiency condition is met whenever
ρRI ≤ ∆ρ
2
2nD . In terms of the job t, through the expression of robust UCB
index ρRI, the case is met whenever,
t ≥ 336uρn
2D2 log(T )
∆2 ρ4
(14)
where uρ is an upper bound on the second moment of completion time (can
be shown via easy computation).
Case (ii): xPSTi (t)×(ρˆi+ρRI) = (βˆi−βRI) log
(
1
1−ε
)
or xPSTi (t) =
βˆi−βRI
ρˆi+ρRI
log
(
1
1−ε
)
.
Unlike ρi where samples are obtained for every t, the samples from surro-
gate are obtained after multiple (yet finite due to bounded β) jobs. To
simplify our analysis, we consider as if a sample of βi is obtained for every
job, the difference due to this simplification is only within constant factors.
Consider,
x∗i (ρ, β)− xPSTi (t)
=
min
(
D,βi log
(
1
1−ε
))
ρi
− βˆi − βRI
ρˆi + ρRI
log
(
1
1− ε
)
≤
(
βi
ρi
− βˆi − βRI
ρˆi + ρRI
)
log
(
1
1− ε
)
≤
(
βˆi + βRI
ρˆi − ρRI −
βˆi − βRI
ρˆi + ρRI
)
log
(
1
1− ε
)
W.h.p ρi ≥ ρˆi − ρRI and βi ≤ βˆi + βRI. As the surrogate observes at most
one sample for every sample of ρi, we have βRI ≥ ρRI
≤ βRI × 2ρ¯+ 2β¯
ρ2
log
(
1
1− ε
)
This gives us that the sufficiency condition is met whenever βRI ≤ ∆ρ
2
n(2ρ¯+2β¯) log( 11−ε)
.
In terms of the round t, the sufficiency condition is met whenever
t ≥
64n2uβ log(T )(2ρ¯+ 2β¯)
2 log2
(
1
1−ε
)
∆2 ρ4
(15)
where uβ is an upper bound on the second moment on the TTF. From
eq. (13) and eq. (15), the optimal set is chosen after O(log(T )) online jobs.
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As mentioned earlier, the regret in this setting arises first out of sub-optimal
set selection and thereon out of sub-optimal allocation. Through theorem 2,
we bound the number of jobs where sub-optimal set is chosen. The following
theorem establishes the asymptotic efficiency of our learning scheme.
Theorem 3. Average regret of TD-UCB mechanism approaches zero asymp-
totically.
Proof: WLOG due to Theorem 2, we will consider the case where the
active set is the optimal set. Let k∗ be the last member in the active set.
The average regret, for the job t, is then given by
Ravg,t =
n∑
i=1
ck
∗
(x∗i − xPSTi (t))
t
Through steps similar to the proof of theorem 2, we have for a job t for an
agent i either
ck
∗
(x∗i − xPSTi (t))
t
≤ 2DρRI
t× ρ2
or
ck
∗
(x∗i − xPSTi (t))
t
≤ βRI
t
× 2ρ¯+ 2β¯
ρ2
log
(
1
1− ε
)
.
As both βRI/t and ρRI/t approach zero, we have
lim
t→∞Ravg,t = 0.
7 Simulations
We have shown theoretical guarantees on the regret in the asymptotic sense.
In practice, the constants pertaining to the same are unknown. Also, our
algorithm focusses on the optimization of social welfare. However, the pay-
ments to the workers involve externality to the workers which depend on
the Robust UCB learning scheme. The learning scheme does not provide
guarantees on the stochastic parameters for the sub-optimal workers. But
the payments to the optimal worker set may also involve these parameters of
the sub-optimal workers. Hence the simulations help us to form a fair idea
about the same. Therefore, in order to investigate the efficacy of our algo-
rithm in practical terms, we tested our method on synthetically generated
datasets.
We simulated a set of 400 diverse workers with different costs, completion
times and error rates. We fixed the following values, ρ = 50, ρ = 100, β = 25,
β = 35, c = 10 and c = 100. Out of the 400 workers, 250 high performing
workers were simulated with ρ values uniformly sampled from [50, 75], β
values uniformly from [30, 35] and costs from [10, 50]. A set of 150 mediocre
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workers were also simulated. These workers were simulated with ρ values
set to 100, β to 25, and costs to 100. The deadline D was fixed as 50 and
the error probability threshold (ε) for an agent allocated a task was set to
0.01.
We checked the performance of our algorithm for a total of 106 jobs. The
baseline used for comparison is the omniscient greedy allocation scheme with
the parameters β and ρ known. We refer to this baseline as ‘Optimal’. In the
context of payments, the ‘Optimal’ baseline refers to the minimum payment
for inducing truthful reports for the greedy allocation aware of the means.
With increasing number of jobs, we observed that the total payment re-
duced and the negative social welfare decreased. The plots for the same are
shown in fig. 2(a) and fig. 2(b). The performance of TD-UCB improves to-
wards ‘Optimal’ when executed over more jobs. This shows that the learning
improves over time and converges to the optimal set / optimal allocation.
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Figure 2: (a) Negative Social Welfare of the workers, (b) Total Payment to
the workers. No. of workers = 400, ε = 0.01
8 Future Work
Following are some directions for future work.
a) The derivation of theoretical bounds on the payments to the workers is still
an open question. It would be interesting to see how these learned values
affect the payment.
b) Investigate the use of other models for the JCT and TTF. For instance,
the error committed by a worker could be modelled as a Bernoulli random
variable the bias of which could depend on the time to completion. Such
models would pose more challenges for the learning due to the interdepen-
dency between the stochastic parameters.
c) In our formulation of the problem in eq. (2), we have posed the constraint on
meeting the deadline as a requirement to be met in expectation. We would
also be interested in satisfying the constraints in a probabilistic sense.
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